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3.1  A Historical Overview of Economic Performance 
Unlike most other socialist countries, Czechoslovakia used to be a relatively 
developed economy that became underdeveloped as a result of  an externally 
imposed system.' It is also a country that maintained relative macro stability 
and thus entered the economic transformation of the 1990s in a better position 
than the other socialist economies. Finally, both within the Soviet bloc and in 
comparison with all countries, Czechoslovakia displayed one of the most equal 
distributions of income (Yotopoulos and Nugent  1976; and Begg 1991). On 
the political side, Czechoslovakia is currently undertaking a peaceful partition 
along national lines that will result in the creation of independent Czech and 
Slovak republics in 1993. 
Czechoslovakia was created out of the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Em- 
pire as a single state composed of the Czech and Slovak lands. Before the 
Second World War,  Czechoslovakia was a democracy, with GNP per capita 
similar to  that  of  Austria.2 However, owing to historical  factors,  Slovakia 
started as an economically less developed agricultural region, while the Czech 
lands were industrialized and economically advanced. As a result of targeted 
government policies, these differences diminished substantially over the fol- 
lowing seven decades. 
During the pre-World  War I1 period, Czechoslovakia was a successful open 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of  the authors. They do not represent official 
views of the Czech government. The authors would like to thank David Begg and other conference 
participants for useful comments on an earlier draft of the paper and Josef Kotrba for valuable 
research assistance. This paper was partially supported by grant 806-34  from the National Council 
for Soviet and East European Research. 
1. For an account of Czechoslovak economic development, see, e.g., Begg (1991). 
2. As Gelb and Grey (1991) indicate, in 1938 the GDP per capita in Austria and Czechoslovakia 
was $400 and $380, respectively. 
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economy, with about 30 percent foreign capital ownership and well-developed 
human capital. Its industries were technologically advanced, and its products 
were renowned worldwide for their workmanship. 
By 1990, Czechoslovak GNP per capita was reported by the World Bank at 
$3,300,  thus  being  in  line  with  those  of  Venezuela  and  Yugoslavia, but 
amounting to only about 25 percent of that of  A~stria.~  The discrepancy be- 
tween the Czechoslovak and Western GNPs increased further in 1991 as the 
officially recorded Czechoslovak GNP declined by  an estimated  16 percent 
(see table 3.1). The economy was closed  and  strictly regulated,  and many 
Czechoslovak products were of mediocre quality, selling at a discount and with 
some difficulty in the West. Compared to Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovakia 
was more centralized and, according to some observers (see, e.g., Begg 1991), 
also falling behind in terms of economic growth. 
This negative development occurred over four decades. During the post- 
World War TI  reconstruction of 1945-47, the country was still a market econ- 
omy, although large industrial enterprises as well as banking  and insurance 
companies were already nationalized.  After the February  1948 Communist 
takeover, the Soviet system of central planning was introduced into the econ- 
omy, the remaining private firms were nati~nalized,~  and heavy industry was 
assigned priority in the development strategy. Czechoslovak foreign trade was 
forcefully reoriented from world markets toward the Soviet bloc countries. 
The Czechoslovak government relied on central planning as the operating 
system throughout the 1950s. The economic slowdown in the early 1960s re- 
sulted in reforms, which culminated during the Prague Spring of  1968 with a 
partial program of price liberalization, an attempt at separating economic pol- 
icy from political decision making, more enterprise autonomy, and workers’ 
participation in enterprise management. However, the system of central plan- 
ning was reimposed after the 1968 Soviet-led invasion, and it remained virtu- 
ally intact until the late 1980s. 
Czechoslovakia also had a long history of monetary and fiscal conservatism. 
Already in 1919, one year after the creation of the country, Czechoslovakia’s 
finance minister, Alois Rasin,  took  effective  measures  to terminate within 
Czechoslovakia the hyperinflation that raged throughout the former Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. By temporarily closing the border, stamping the Austro- 
Hungarian currency that was in circulation in the Czechoslovak territory at the 
time, and recognizing the stamped currency as the only legal tender, he turned 
Czechoslovakia into an island of stability while hyperinflation continued in all 
the neighboring econ~mies.~  This initial conservatism was followed through- 
3. The estimated GNP of Czechoslovakia naturally depends on the methodology used. Other 
4. Private agriculture was collectivized or converted into state farms. 
5. For details, see, e.g., Sargent (1986, chap. 3). 
studies generate higher estimates. Table 3.1  Production, Employment,  and Unemployment 
1990  1991  1992= 





CSFR  1.95 
CR  1.6 




CSFR  ... 
CSFR  ... 
CR  ... 
SR  ... 
Real ind. prod.: 
% 
CSFR  2.4 
CR  2.3 
SR  2.6 
(continued) 
100.0  91.8  99.4  96.0  108.6  99.0  87.5  81.8  71.8  77.3  76.9  70.0  69.7 
.7  ............  -1.1  -4.6  -11.4  --16.0  ,-19.5  -19.5  -20.0  -17.5 
.9  _..  __.  __.  _._  -1.1  -4.9  -11.7  -16.0  -19.0  -19.0  -18.0-15.0 
.2  ............  -5.8  -5.2  -11.1  -16.0  -18.0  -18.0  ...... 
100.0  94.5  100.2  97.6  106.1  99.6  91.7  87.4  76.6  79.3  83.8  78.2  77.6 
............... -.5  -3.0  -8.0  -12.5  -15.9  -15.9  -14.7-13.0 
_._  ___  ._.  ___  __.  -1.1  -1.9  -10.0  -12.3  -14.1  -14.1  -17.4-14.0 
.....................  -8.0  -13.0  -14.0  -14.0  -18.0  -15.0 
.7  -2.9  -3.0  -3.7  -3.7  -3.7  ... -15.1  -19.8  -23.1  -23.1  -25.9-18.9 
1.3  -2.9  -2.8  -3.7  -3.5  -3.5  -8.7  -14.4  -18.8  -22.5  -22.5  -22.7  -18.5 
-.8  -3.1  -3.6  -3.9  -4.1  -4.1  ... -16.7  -20.5  -24.9  -24.9  -25.5  -18.8 Table 3.1  (continued) 
1990  1991  1992' 
1985-89  1989  1  2  3  4  1990  1  2  3  4  1991  1  2 
Real agri. prod.: 
% A:d 
CSFR  1.4  1.7 
CR  1.0  2.3 
SR  2.3  .6 
Employment: 
% A:b.' 
CSFR  .7  .3 
CR  .6  .6 
SR  .9  -  .2 
Unemployment 
rate (%):' 
CSFR  ...  ... 
CR  ...  ... 
SR  ...  ... 
............  -3.9  ............  -8.4  ...... 
............  -2.3  ............  -8.9  ...... 
............  -7.2  ............  -7.4  ...... 
-.7  -1.3  -1.7  -2.5  -2.5  -8.4  -9.7  -11.1  -12.5  -12.5  -13.4  -12.2 
-.8  -1.3  -1.6  -2.5  -2.5  -8.4  -10.0  -11.2  -12.9  -12.9  -15.0-13.8 
-.7  -1.3  -1.9  -2.7  -2.7  -8.2  -9.1  -10.7  -11.7  -11.7  -12.3-11.0 
.........  .8  .8  2.3  3.8  5.6  6.6  6.6  6.5  5.5 
.........  .I  .I  1.7  2.6  3.8  4.1  4.1  3.7  2.7 
.........  1.0  1.0  3.7  6.3  9.6  11.8  11.8  12.3  11.3 
- 
Source: Federal Statistical Office and Czech Statistical Office. 
Note: CSF'R  =  Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; CR =  Czech Republic; SR =  Slovak Republic. 
a1992 data for the CSF'R, CR, and SR are preliminary. Data for 1990-92  have not yet been made consistent across the CR, 
SR, and CSFR. 
bCumulative percentage change related to the period up to the same quarter in the preceding year. 
'1991 and 1992 data include small and private enterprises. 
dPercentage change related to preceding year. Data are not collected on a quarterly basis. 
=Average  number of employees in the state and private enterprises. 
'End-of-quarter (year) data. Employment = average number of employees in the state and cooperative sectors. 97  Stabilization and Transition in Czechoslovakia 
out the two decades of  democracy and also until the final phase of  Commu- 
nist rule. 
The World Bank estimates of Czechoslovak GNP per capita are based on 
current exchange rates, and as such they are possibly downwardly biased. Nev- 
ertheless,  the long-term decline in  Czechoslovakia’s welfare relative to ad- 
vanced economies is self-evident. One thus has to accept the official and West- 
em data on Czechoslovakia’s long-term economic growth with caution. These 
data suggest that the most impressive rate of growth occurred during the First 
Five-Year Plan (1949-53),  when the official measure of net material product 
(NMP) increased nearly 10 percent per annum. However, this rate of growth 
proved unsustainable. The first half of the 1960s witnessed virtual stagnation 
and resulted in the subsequent reform. The economy grew at about 7 percent 
a year during the reform period,  1965-70,  and it registered almost 6 percent 
annual growth in the early to mid-1970s. A major  slowdown in the rate of 
growth to 3.6 percent occurred between  1975 and 1980 as the first oil shock 
turned the terms of trade against Czechoslovakia within the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA). This was also a period of poor agricultural per- 
formance. 
The 1980s witnessed a further deceleration in economic growth. The world 
recession, rising input prices, and restrictive government policies resulted in a 
1.8 percent growth rate in the first half of the 1980s. As can be seen from table 
3.1, the situation did not improve markedly in the second half of the 1980s as 
the growth rate of NMP was only 1.9 percent a year in the period  1985-89. 
With economic observers noting that inflation was being underestimated, the 
1980s may  in fact be  seen as a decade of  economic  stagnation  (see, e.g., 
Dyba 1989). 
Other indicators also signaled deterioration in economic performance and 
increasingly desperate attempts on the part of the Communist government to 
maintain a degree of public support. The ratio of net fixed investment to NMP 
fell from 20 percent in 1975 to a mere 13 percent in the late 1980s, and the 
share of consumption in NMP rose. Export growth slowed down in the 1980s, 
and exports to developing countries were accompanied to an increasing extent 
by trade credits. Czechoslovakia became a net creditor within the CMEA, es- 
pecially vis-2-vis the Soviet Union and Poland. This was increasingly, albeit 
reluctantly, financed by borrowing in the West. 
The long-term deterioration in economic performance was caused by a num- 
ber of factors. The centralization af  the economy after 1948 first created strong 
growth as the system rapidly mobilized  existing resources.  Another  source 
of growth was the rapid increase in inputs, which temporarily resulted in a 
high growth rate. The shortcomings of the command system, which gradually 
became overwhelming, were the perverse incentives, limited innovation, inef- 
ficient allocation of resources, and rigidities. These latter factors became par- 
ticularly important as demand patterns started to change, input growth could 
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declined. Czechoslovakia also suffered from its isolation from world markets 
and its extreme reorientation toward trade within the CMEA. This reorienta- 
tion increased the technological backwardness of Czechoslovak industry and 
its vulnerability to disruptions in the CMEA markets. 
3.2  The Principal Measures during Stabilization and Transition 
3.2.1  The Start of Economic Transformation, 1989-90 
The November 1989 revolution brought in a liberally oriented transitional 
government and created expectations of  a radical  economic transformation 
from a command to a market economy. The new government immediately de- 
valued the koruna (KEs) vis-2-vis the convertible currencies, revalued it vis-i- 
vis the ruble, and tightened budgetary policies for 1990, setting itself the target 
of a 1-1.5  percent budget surplus. The government also declared that the intro- 
duction  of  a market economy and integration  with the Western economies 
would be the key to reestablishing economic prosperity. Specific proposals for 
the  strategy  of  economic transformation  were  quickly  put  forth (see,  e.g., 
Svejnar 1989), but disagreement also emerged about both the direction of the 
economic transition and the nature and timing of specific measures. As a re- 
sult, a government economic strategy reflecting the principles outlined above 
was not officially adopted until 24 May 1990. 
The 8-9  June parliamentary  elections brought in a coalition that broadly 
favored the market-oriented transformation.6 The new government in principle 
adopted the 24 May economic resolution, but few significant economic mea- 
sures were adopted in the immediate postelection period. The two important 
measures were the elimination of a negative turnover tax, which was accompa- 
nied by a Ki-s 140 compensation for each citizen on 9 July 1990, and the grad- 
ual start of negotiations of new commercial policies with various market econ- 
omies and organizations such as the EEC. 
The main reason for delaying the economic transformation was the fact that 
other factors made rapid progress in designing and implementing an economic 
transition problematic. The most important of these factors were the inability 
to achieve consensus on the details of an economic program within the execu- 
tive branch of the federal government, the desire of the new Parliament to play 
a major role in preparing economic laws and policies, the need to create a new 
set of economic laws,’ and the start of difficult negotiations about the relative 
6. The election  brought about major personnel  changes in the federal Parliament, with the 
broadly based Civic Forum and Public Against Violence parties together winning 170 of the 300 
total seats, the Communist party retaining only forty-seven seats, and the Christian Democratic 
Alliance  capturing  forty seats. Less extensive personnel  turnover took place in the executive 
branch since many of the ministers of  the transitional government belonged to the newly formed 
coalition among the Civic Forum, Public Against Violence, and Christian Democrat parties. 
7. An alternative would have been to adopt temporarily a modified set of Western (e.g., German 
or EEC) laws. However, in view of the voluminous nature of Western legal statutes and the paucity 
of skilled translators, it turned out to be simpler to create a new set of Czechoslovak laws. 99  Stabilization and Transition in Czechoslovakia 
jurisdictions of the federal and the two national (Czech and Slovak) govern- 
ments. 
On 1 September 1990, the government formally submitted to the Parliament 
a “scenario of economic reform.” The document outlined economic and social 
principles, specific measures, and time parameters. It was also a political docu- 
ment that reflected the compromises that were hastily concluded among the 
major groups in the Parliament. 
On  the  macroeconomic  front,  the  scenario  emphasized  a  strict  anti- 
inflationary policy. All other macroeconomic goals (growth, employment, and 
balance of payments) were “within reasonable limits” subordinate. In order to 
realize the anti-inflationary policy, the government set as specific 1990 policy 
targets zero growth of  money supply and a budget surplus of  at least  1-1.5 
percent.* Measures proposed for 1991 were a continuation of the earlier set of 
policies, but they were more far reaching in that they included a restrictive 
monetary policy, a 2-2.5  percent budget surplus, a convertible koruna for cur- 
rent account transactions, and a positive real interest rate. 
The proposed micro policies aimed at inducing efficient allocation of re- 
sources, introducing new institutions, and minimizing the social costs of transi- 
tion. The micro transformation  was to be achieved through (a)  a major tax 
reform emphasizing the introduction of a value-added tax, a personal income 
tax, and an “enterprise” tax, (b)  a budgetary reform stressing independence of 
units and ensuring the transparency of budgetary allocations, (c)  de-itatization 
and privatization of property, (d)  price liberalization, (e)  internal convertibility 
of the koruna, (f)  reduction and retraining of redundant labor, (8)  legalization 
of collective bargaining together with a high tax on wage growth exceeding 
limits set by government, and (h)  restructuring of social security and health 
care systems and a gradual separation of their funding from the state budget. 
The Parliament speedily approved the scenario, but it immediately faced the 
problem of  how to draft and pass the large number of laws and decrees that 
needed to be put in place before the transformation would be launched on 1 
January 1991. This indeed proved to be a major burden, and the resulting fa- 
tigue was increasingly visible. The introduction of some widely expected laws 
(e.g., those related to the privatization of small enterprises) was consequently 
delayed. 
3.2.2  Transformation Measures Undertaken in 1991 and 1992 
On  1 January 1991, the government launched a major set of reforms, con- 
sisting of liberalizing 85 percent of producer and consumer prices, devaluing 
the koruna and pegging it to a basket of five Western currencies, introducing 
internal convertibility of the koruna together with a 20 percent import sur- 
charge, controlling the growth of wages, and activating a social safety net. 
These radical measures were introduced in the context of a proclaimed de- 
termination to pursue restrictive macro policies, and they were supplemented 
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by a strong push to speed up the privatization process, attract foreign capital, 
promote the growth of private firms, decrease government subsidies to firms 
as well as some other government expenditures (e.g., on arms), and generally 
reduce the role of the state in the economy. In many respects, the measures 
introduced by the Czechoslovak authorities in January 1991 resembled those 
launched by the Poles a year earlier. 
The broad quantity targets declared by  the government for  1991 were to 
limit inflation in terms of the GDP deflator to 30 percent, GDP decline to 5-10 
percent,  unemployment to a 4.5 percent annual average rate, and real wage 
decline to 10 percent. The target for the current account was a deficit of  KEs 
2.5 billion. 
For 1992, the.government set itself the target of at least partially liberalizing 
the remaining controlled prices, especially in the area of apartment rents, trans- 
portation and communication, and water and sewage. Money supply was to 
increase  10-15  percent, while the exchange rate policy  was  to remain un- 
changed. Unemployment was expected to rise further, and the government in- 
tended to maintain an incomes policy for state enterprises with more than 150 
employees. Privatization of small units was to contin~e,~  and that of large firms 
was to be launched on a large scale, covering about twenty-five hundred out of 
a total of about six thousand state enterprises in the first privatization wave. 
Additional likely measures were to include lower interest rates to stimulate 
investment, stronger indirect support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
regional policies, development of a more efficient banking sector through pri- 
vatization and greater independence of commercial banks as well as increased 
competition, greater regulation of certain parts of the capital market (e.g., the 
investment privatization funds), gradual introduction of  a new tax system to- 
gether  with  superior  tax  collection  and  enforcement,  restructuring  (de- 
ktatization) of social security, and further liberalization of foreign trade. 
The government generally persevered in pursuing the policies set for 1991 
and  1992, but, as we will  show presently, it did not reach all its targets. In 
terms of policy implementation, one can see from table 3.2 that bank credit to 
state enterprises and households was held in check, rising somewhat in nomi- 
nal but falling significantly in real terms in  1991 and declining absolutely in 
1992. In contrast, bank credit to private enterprises rose from almost zero in 
mid-1990 to KEs 71.4 billion at the end of 1991 and KEs 125.7 billion in mid- 
1992. Credit to private firms thus became equivalent to  12 percent of  credit 
extended by banks to state enterprises at the end of  1991 and 22.3 percent in 
mid-1992. In  1991, the rise in this ratio reflected the growing emphasis on 
credit expansion for the newly forming private firms. In  1992, the increase 
also reflected the transformation of large state enterprises into private joint- 
stock companies. 
9. Between January 1991 and June 1992, over 25,000 units were sold in auctions. Prices ranged 
from several hundred dollars to a record price exceeding $10 million. Table 3.2  Credit to Enterprises and Households (KEs billion) 
1990  1991  1992 
1985-89  1989  1  2  3  4  1990  I  2  3  4  1991  1  2 








































530.9  524.4  532.9  540.3  529.8  529.8  558.4  586.6  599.9  575.3  575.3  574.0  564.9 
360.5  314.3  387.6  395.4  383.0  383.0  397.1  414.2  420.0  403.7  403.7  398.1  390.5 
170.4  210.1  145.3  144.9  146.8  146.8  161.3  172.4  179.9  171.6  171.6  175.9  174.4 
.....  .5  1.4  3.4  3.4  9.3  24.7  40.5  71.4  71.4  85.4  125.7 
.....  .4  1.1  2.8  2.8  7.7  20.5  33.1  55.5  55.5  64.3  94.4 
.....  .I  .3  .6  .6  1.6  4.2  7.4  15.9  15.9  21.1  31.3 
7.2  10.6  13.8  27.8  53.6  53.6  76.4  56.8 
4.8  6.4  8.3  18.0  37.8  37.8  56.5  32.1 




............... 44.9  78.6  123.4  147.1  145.4  145.4  143.3  123.7 
............... 31.8  55.6  88.8  100.2  101.7  101.7  98.8  79.3 
...............  13.1  23.0  34.6  46.9  43.7  43.7  44.5  44.4 
46.9  44.5  47.1  47.2  50.0  50.0  51.2  51.6  52.7  55.4  55.4  56.3  55.7 
29.5  27.2  29.8  29.9  31.8  31.8  32.4  33.2  33.9  36.2  36.2  37.4  37.2 
17.4  17.3  17.3  17.3  18.2  18.2  18.8  18.4  18.8  19.2  19.2  18.9  18.5 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Czech Statistical Office, and the Czechoslovak State Bank. 
Note: CSFR =  Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; CR  = Czech Republic; SR = Slovak Republic. 
"End-of-quarter  (year) data. 
bFrozen  payments due to insufficient  balances in the bank accounts of debtor enterprises (bank data) 
'Unpaid obligations past maturity data (enterprise accounts). 102  Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar 
As can be seen from table 3.3, all three measures of  money supply (MO, 
M1, and M2) grew at less than half the rate of inflation in both 1990 and 199  1. 
The more expansive monetary policy, preannounced for 1992, is visible in the- 
data as of the second quarter of  1992. The restrictive money supply policy of 
1990-91  was accompanied by rising (not freely set until mid-1992) interest 
rates. The government also permitted the protected banking sector to establish 
a sizable spread between the interest rates on loans and deposits, thus allowing 
the banks to build up reserves. The official, unified exchange rate, established 
at the start of 1991, was set near the parallel market rate, and the differential 
between the two has remained quite small. Czechoslovakia's modest foreign 
debt increased from $8.1 billion at the end of  1990 to $9.4 billion by the end 
of  1991 as the country borrowed $2.135 billion in  1991.'" However, the in- 
creased debt was fully reflected in increased foreign currency reserves, which 
rose from $1.2 billion in December 1990 to $3.3 billion in December  1991. 
The debt remained virtually unchanged in the first half of 1992, thus testifying 
to the country's ability to proceed with the economic transformation without 
incurring a major foreign debt burden. 
As can be seen from table 3.4, fiscal policy  was  initially somewhat less 
successful. After finishing 1990 with a minor surplus, registering significant 
budget surpluses in the first six months of  199  1, and still achieving small sur- 
pluses until October, the government ended 1991 with a KCs 22.1 billion defi- 
cit. While this deficit constituted only 5 percent of budget expenditures, it re- 
flected a potentially problematic dynamics. In particular, the early surpluses 
were brought about primarily by high enterprise income and profit taxes, which 
reflected the initial profitability after price liberalization,"  and the still rela- 
tively low level of unemployment compensation and other expenditures. As 
enterprise profits declined and additional state expenditures on health and edu- 
cation were approved by  republican Parliaments in October, government ex- 
penditures began to exceed revenues. It is interesting to note that, while unem- 
ployment  rose  dramatically  during  the  year,  the  level  of  unemployment 
compensation expenditures did not reach the level of reserves allocated for this 
purpose. Rather, the achievement of zero inflation led to pressure to increase 
government expenditures, which were automatically processed by the banks. 
The initial success with inflation thus reduced fiscal coordination and resulted 
in reduced policy control. 
For 1992, the government has agreed to decrease agricultural subsidies and 
improve the targeting of the social safety net. The goal is to reduce current and 
increase investment expenditures in real terms. As can be seen from table 3.4, 
10. The loans were provided as follows: $1,313 million from the International Monetary Fund, 
$205 million from the World  Bank, $248 million from the European Community, $89 million 
from the (3-24, and $280 million from the financial sector. 
11. The high profitability reflected both the fact that enterprises accumulated raw material inven- 
tories before price liberalization and the custom of paying income and profit taxes on the value of 
delivered rather than paid-for goods. Table 3.3  Money Supply, Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, and External Debt 
1990  1991  1992 
1985-89  1989  1  2  3  4  1990  1  2  3  4  1991  1  2 
Money supply (% A):a 
MO  5.5  8.8  2.9  6.5  7.7  8.4  8.4  -1.1  3.4  9.5  20.0  20.0  -2.5  7.5 
M1  4.0  .5  -7.4  -2.5  -5.3  -6.4  -6.4  -3.4  -1.1  9.8  28.8  28.8  -4.1  .8 
M2  5.8  3.5  -2.3  -.2  -1.5  .5  .5  -.3  5.6  12.4  27.3  27.3  2.0  7.1 
Loans  5.1  5.0  5.4  5.4  5.6  7.6  5.9  14.7  15.1  14.2  13.9  14.5  13.5  13.7 
Deposits  3.1  3.2  2.6  2.7  2.8  3.3  2.8  7.6  8.2  8.6  8.0  8.1  8.7  6.9 
Commercial  15.1  15.1  16.5  16.6  16.0  22.7  18.0  ..................... 
Tourist  ...  ...  37.6  30.2  27.0  31.0  30.9  ..................... 
Auction  ...  121.2  78.8  48.0  34.3  41.1  50.4  ..................... 
Parallel market  33.70  42.4  41.5  36.3  33.3  41.0  38.0  34.1  31.7  32.5  30.8  32.3  30.2  30.0 
Official (unified)  ...  ..................  27.9  30.3  30.5  29.2  29.5  28.8  28.8 
Extemaldebt($billion)’  6.2  7.9  7.4  7.1  7.6  8.1  8.1  8.3  8.8  9.3  9.4  9.4  8.9  9.8 
Nominal interest rate (%):b 
Exchange rate (KEs/$):~ 
Source: The Czechoslovak State Bank. 
aEnd-of-quarter (year) data reflecting changes relative to the end of the previous year. MO  = currency; MI =  MO plus demand 
deposits; M2 = M1 plus time deposits and foreign currency deposits. 
hAverage  rate in respective quarter (year). 
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Table 3.4  Fiscal Budgets of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (billions of 
current Kfs) 
1989  1990  1991  1992' 
Revenue 
Turnover tax 




Subsidies to entcrprises 
Social security 















































Source: Federal Ministry of Finance. 
"anuar-August  data. 
the consolidated budget was maintained in surplus during the first eight months 
of 1992, with the Czech Republic running a slight surplus and the Slovak Re- 
public running a deficit. 
3.2.3  External Shocks 
In assessing the effect of the Czechoslovak stabilization and transition poli- 
cies, one must bear in mind that these policies were carried out in the context 
of the disintegration of the CMEA and the decline in economic activity among 
the traditional trading partners. The absorption of East Germany by West Ger- 
many in 1990 represented the first shock as East Germany was a major trading 
partner, accounting for approximately  10 percent of Czechoslovakia's foreign 
trade. Further shock came from the disintegration of the Soviet economy and 
the reduced demand from recession-stricken East European trading partners. 
Finally, the switch from CMEA trade to free trade based on world prices on 1 
January  1991 resulted  in  a  significant  shift in  the  terms  of  trade  against 
Czechoslovakia.  Official  calculations  point  to  a  26  percent  worsening  of 
Czechoslovakia's terms of trade in the first quarter, 28 percent in the second 
quarter, and a cumulative 22 percent decline in the first three quarters of  1991. 
3.3  Economic Developments in 1989-92 
As can be seen from table 3.1 above, the slowdown in NMP growth to 0.7 
percent in  1989 turned into a 1.1 percent decline in  1990 and a further 19.5 
percent decline in 1991. The sizable decline in 1991 was accounted for primar- 
ily by  a 23.1 percent fall in industrial production as agriculture declined by a 
more modest 8.4 percent. Slovakia experienced a somewhat greater decrease 105  Stabilization and Transition in Czechoslovakia 
in industrial production (24.9 percent) than the Czech lands (22.5 percent) but 
also a shallower decline in agricultural production (7.4 vs. 8.9 percent, respec- 
tively). The Czechoslovak authorities started to calculate GNP in  1991, and 
their estimates suggest that this indicator of performance registered a 16 per- 
cent decline in 199  1. 
As the indices as well as the cumulative percentage change figures in table 
3.1 indicate, the decline in officially measured NMP continued into the second 
quarter of  1992. In contrast, GNP has remained relatively stable since the third 
quarter of 199  1, thus confirming the stronger performance of the service sector 
relative to the rest of the economy. 
It is important to stress that there are several important deficiencies of the 
official data. First, price increases tend to be overestimated as a result of struc- 
tural changes in reporting. In particular, data from stores indicate that there has 
been a lower decline in sales than is generally assumed, thus pointing to an 
overestimation of price increases for a given value of sales. Second, the official 
data underestimate the growth of the private (informal) sector, which escapes 
the official statistical and tax coverage. Hence, although table 3.1 is meant to 
cover all enterprises, it is not clear to what extent the attempt has been success- 
ful. Finally, foreign trade appears to be severely underestimated as mirror sta- 
tistics from the OECD report higher levels of  Czechoslovak exports and im- 
ports than appear in the Czechoslovak customs data (see table 3.5-3.7). 
As is evident from table 3.1 above, the modest growth in employment over 
the mid- to late 1980s turned into a decline in 1990. With a 2.5 percent employ- 
ment decrease in 1990, a 12.5 percent fall in  1991, and a 10 percent decline 
in the first half of  1992, enterprises clearly carried out sizable reductions in 
employment. This is further accentuated by the fact that average hours worked 
declined in most enterprises owing to the elimination of overtime and other 
measures. Nevertheless, through the end of  1991, employment declined in a 
less pronounced way than production. The data for the first two quarters of 
1992 suggest that performance is improving, especially in construction. 
The employment pattern that has emerged is that the initial labor force re- 
Table 3.5  Czechoslovak Foreign Trade (billions of current KCs, f.0.b.) 
1989  1990  1991  1992” 
Exports  217.5  216.5  321.2  176.7 
“Socialist”  countries  132.3  106.7  126.3  43.5 
Market economies  85.2  109.8  194.9  133.2 
Imports  214.7  246.3  293.7  171.7 
‘Socialist” countries  133.8  125.7  125.9  62.7 
Market economies  80.9  120.6  167.8  109.0 
Surplus (deficit)  2.8  (29.8)  27.5  5 .O 
Source: Federal Statistical Office. 
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Table 3.6  Czechoslovak Imports from OECD Countries in 1989-92  (all data 
are monthly averages, $million) 
1991 































406.0  518.0  461.0 
277.0  406.0  347.0 
106.3  86.3  92.1 
7.4  10.2  9.7 
4.2  7.3  4.2 
64.1  52.2  55.0 
23.9  80.2  27.7 
160.7  231.4  216.6 
32.4  30.9  40.6 
16.3  18.7  17.7 
4.7  5.6  4.5 
12.2  11.0  9.8 
20.8  19.0  19.4 
19.7  18.9  16.3 
















658.0  565.0 
487.0  394.0 
138.7  103.4 
13.5  10.3 
6.0  5.7 
91.6  65.5 
33.9  40.1 
320.5  250.2 
49.1  37.9 
26.2  19.6 
5.0  4.3 
15.61  11.63 
23.7  19.8 
26.5  19.0 














Source: OECD, monthly statistics of foreign trade. 
Nore: N.A. = not available. EFTA =  European Free Trade Association. 
Table 3.7  Czechoslovak Exports to OECD Countries in 1989-92  (all data are 
monthly averages, $million) 
1991 
















347.0  408.0  476.0  500.0  546.0  678.0 
238.0  285.0  359.0  381.0  416.0  532.0 
76.2  84.3  80.7  77.5  83.0  100.9 
7.2  7.3  9.2  10.1  13.0  15.8 
10.8  10.7  10.3  11.4  7.7  12.9 
42.4  47.1  44.2  46.7  53.1  68.1 
22.4  29.0  28.9  30.4  31.3  35.4 
110.7  140.2  215.1  220.5  259.8  328.2 
33.8  39.9  38.5  49.0  43.5  72.5 
16.0  18.6  22.2  21.7  21.2  25.3 
7.3  7.3  7.3  9.2  8.3  11.2 
9.6  10.4  10.9  9.8  9.8  10.67 
10.4  9.9  9.9  10.3  8.9  10.77 
21.4  20.1  16.5  19.1  19.8  21.5 






























Source: OECD, monthly statistics of  foreign trade. 
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ductions usually took the form of  retirements  and the termination  of  guest 
workers. This was followed by hiring freezes and, eventually, layoffs. Among 
the Czechoslovak workers, hardest hit at first were hence the labor force en- 
trants (especially young people) as insiders in state enterprises temporarily 
insulated themselves from the effect of the external shock and the transition. 
Interestingly, as layoffs began to take place, the effect was inversely propor- 
tional to age, with the older (preretirement-age) workers suffering the lowest 
unemployment rate. However, as the transition entered its second full year in 
1992, one began to observe significant layoffs among the workers of preretire- 
ment age as well. 
As the unemployment data in table 3.1 indicate, unemployment was a virtu- 
ally unknown phenomenon in Czechoslovakia until the second half of  1990. 
Unemployment became serious in 1991, the overall rate rising from less than 
1 percent at the start of the year to 6.6 percent at year’s end. The Czechoslovak 
government estimates that about one-third of reported unemployment in  199  1 
was fictitious, covering individuals who were gainfully employed but collect- 
ing unemployment bersfits or those who did not actively look for work. The 
reduction of the unemployment benefits and the halving of the eligibility pe- 
riod from one year to six months at the start of 1992 contributed to the fall in 
the unemployment rate from 6.6 to 6.5 percent in the first quarter and 5.5 per- 
cent in the second quarter of  1992, Other factors that are cited by officials in 
the federal as well as the Czech and Slovak labor ministries as possibly contrib- 
uting to this unexpected decline in the unemployment rate are the boom in the 
private sector of the economy, the active labor market policies of the govern- 
ment, and the unwillingness of directors of state enterprises to lay off workers 
and risk conflict before privatization. 
There has been a remarkable asymmetry across the Czech and Slovak repub- 
lics in unemployment dynamics. While employment declined by about 2.5 per- 
cent in 1990 and by  12-13  percent in 1991 in both republics, unemployment 
has risen much more rapidly in Slovakia. By the end of  1991, the unemploy- 
ment rate was 4.1 percent in the Czech lands and  11.8 percent in Slovakia. 
Moreover, in the first quarter of  1992, the unemployment rate fell from 4.  I  to 
3.7 percent in the Czech Republic but increased from 11.8 to 12.3 percent in 
the Slovak Republic. The discrepancy in the unemployment rates of  the two 
republics reflects a faster rise of the private sector in the Czech Republic, a 
more liberal application of unemployment compensation and severance pay 
policies in Slovakia, a stronger tendency for older workers to take (early) re- 
tirement in the Czech Republic, and the higher propensity of Czech workers to 
find employment in Austria and Germany. Interestingly, starting in the second 
quarter of  1992, one can observe a downward trend in the unemployment rate 
in Slovakia as well. Both republics registered a one-point decline in the unem- 
ployment rate in the second quarter, resulting in a 2.7 percent rate in the Czech 
lands and  11.3 percent in Slovakia, The preliminary  data for October 1992 Table 3.8  Prices, Wages, and Consumption 
~  ~____  ________  ~ 
1990  1991  1992" 
1985-89  1989  1  2  3  4  1990  1  2  3  4  1991  1  2 












Nominal earnings (8  A):< 
Real personal 




1.0  1.4  2.4  3.1  13.6  18.4  18.4  40.9  49.2  49.5  53.6  53.6  1.8  3.0 
1.0  1.5  2.2  2.7  13.3  17.5  17.5  39.3  48.0  48.1  52.0  52.0  2.2  3.8 
.9  1.3  2.3  3.8  14.0  19.2  19.2  44.9  51.6  53.4  58.3  58.3  1.4  1.9 
.2  -.7  .3  .4  .5  16.6  16.6  48.1  53.7  53.0  54.8  54.8  2.9  5.2 
.4  .1  .5  .6  .7  15.6  15.6  48.7  54.2  54.5  56.6  56.6  3.2  6.0 
-.2  -2.7  -.2  -.l  .O  19.4  19.4  45.3  51.5  48.7  50.6  50.6  2.3  3.6 
2.0  2.4  3.6  2.7  2.8  3.6  3.6  6.0  10.5  12.2  16.4  16.4  21.2  22.1 
2.0  2.4  3.5  2.6  2.7  3.4  3.4  5.8  13.8  12.3  16.3  16.3  21.3  23.0 
2.1  2.6  3.7  2.9  3.0  3.9  3.9  6.1  10.8  12.2  16.6  16.6  20.5  19.7 
2.9  1.8  ............ 1.1  -26.0  -37.1  -34.3  -33.1  -33.1  -4.6  5.0 
2.8  1.6  ............ 1.7  -24.0  -29.0  -33.5  -29.0  -29.0  ...... 
3.3  2.1  ............  .5  ...  .................. 
Source: Federal Statistical Office and Czech Statistical Office. 
Nore: CSFR = Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; CR = Czech Republic; SR = Slovak Republic. 
"1992 data are preliminary. 
bRefers  to end-of-quarter (year) data, which are cumulative, reflecting changes relative to the end of the previous year. 
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suggest that the unemployment rate in the two republics stood at 2.6 and 11.2 
percent, respectively. 
After decades of seeming stability,12  consumer prices registered an 18.4 per- 
cent increase in 1990, a major 53.6 percent jump in 1991, and a mere 3 percent 
rise in the first two quarters of  1992 (see table 3.8). The 1990 increase was 
brought about primarily by  the removal of the negative turnover tax in July 
and the devaluation of the koruna in the fall. The 1991 and  1992 price in- 
creases, the dynamics of which are captured in detail in table 3.9, reflected 
the liberalization of 85 percent of all prices on  1 January  1991, followed by 
the liberalization of  10 percent of prices in the rest of  1991 and in the first 
half of  1992. As can be seen from table 3.9, the 1991 price liberalization re- 
sulted in a 26 percent jump in consumer prices in January and a gradual taper- 
ing off  of  inflation in the following  five  months. Indeed, consumer prices 
still increased by 7 percent in February and almost 5 percent in March, but 
the monthly rate of  increase remained  at or below 2 percent in the second 
quarter  of  1991.  The  economy  registered  complete  price  stability  from 
July to October, but then consumer prices rose again by  1.6 percent in No- 
vember and  1.2 percent  in December. Monthly  inflation fell  well below  1 
percent in the first eight months of  1992 but jumped by  1.8 percent in  Sep- 
tember.  The  authorities  expect  a  10-12  percent  inflation  rate  for  all  of 
1992. 
While the price rise associated with the July 1990 elimination of the nega- 
tive turnover tax was accompanied by a compensating adjustment in incomes, 
other price increases and the price liberalization of  1991 were carried out in 
the presence of relatively tight controls on wages, at least through the first half 
of  1991. As can be seen from table 3.8 above, nominal earnings increased by 
a mere 3.6 percent in 1990 and 16.4 percent in 1991. Real earnings, measured 
as nominal earnings relative to the consumer price index, hence declined by 
12.5 percent in  1990 and 24 percent in  1991. Personal consumption, which 
still registered a modest  1.1 percent increase in 1990, declined precipitously, 
falling 33 percent in 1991. The decline in the conventionally measured living 
standard has thus been considerable for an average consumer. At the same 
time, the rise of unemployment was stemmed and the success of the stabiliza- 
tion program undoubtedly aided by the ability of the authorities to keep the 
labor cost per worker down. It is worth noting that the situation appears to have 
changed in the first quarter of 1992 as real wages have surged ahead by about 
8 percent. 
There also appears to have been considerable widening of income differ- 
entials  and  stratification in  social  status.  For  many  individuals,  especially 
12. As mentioned earlier, the long-term price stability under the Communist regime was in 
part generated at the expense of  shortages. In addition, it also reflected data manipulation in the 
construction of  the baskets of  commodities for price indices. 110  Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar 
Table 3.9  Consumer and Producer Prices in 1991 (% A relative to preceding month) 

























25.8  7.0  4.7  2.0  1.9  1.8  -.I  .O  .3 
25.8  6.1  4.3  2.4  1.9  1.8  -.3  .O  .3 
25.9  8.8  5.8  .8  1.9  1.8  .5  .S  .1 
24.0  19.3  .I  2.9  1.7  -.8  -.5  .4  -.4 
20.4  22.4  .9  3.0  1.5  -3  -.I  .6  -.3 
33.0  12.3  -2.7  2.6  2.2  -.6  -1.5  .2  -.5 
1.0  .5  .4  .5  .4  .3  .8  .6  1.8 
.9  .7  .6  .6  .S  .4  .6  .6  1.9 
1.2  .2  .O  .I  .2  .2  -.2  .6  1.7 
1.0  1.9  ,I  .5  1.1  .6  .6  .O  .3 
1.0  2.0  .2  .8  1.3  .6  .7  .2  .5 
.9  1.7  p.3  -.l  .8  .6  .5  p.4  -.I 
-.I 
.2 
-  .4 
.O 








1.6  1.2 
1.4  1.1 
1.7  1.9 
.9  .6 
1.2  .4 







Source: Federal Statistical Office and Czech Statistical Office. 
Nore: CSFR =  Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; CR = Czech Republic; SR = Slovak Republic. 
those losing in relative terms, this has been hard to accept. The ability of the 
government to keep the  social peace has  thus been  a remarkable  achieve- 
ment, and it remains to be seen if the situation will remain as peaceful in the 
future. 
The restrictive economic policy, external shocks, and the nature of the trans- 
formation process also resulted in a major decline in investment activity. As 
can be seen from table 3.10, real net fixed investment rose by a mere 2.9 per- 
cent in 1990 and declined by a full 20 percent in 1991. Preliminary estimates 
indicate that the decline has continued in 1992. Given the low product demand, 
restrictive macro policies, and uncertainty over the transfer of property rights, 
enterprises have thus opted to cut down on investment. 
The savings data, reported in tables 3.10 and 3.11 in nominal terms, imply 
a major decline in the propensity to save in koruny in 1990 and the first half of 
1991. There was a more substantial increase in koruna savings in the second 
half of  1991 and the first two quarters of  1992, but the increase still fell short 
of the increase in nominal earnings of  the population. Over the last two years, Table 3.10  Investment and Savings 
~ 
1990  1991  1992' 
1985-89  1989  1  2  3  4  1990  1  2  3  4  1991  I  2 




Savings of population 




Savings of enterprises 




2.8  3.1  ......... 
2.3  1.7  ......... 
3.5  4.1  ......... 
2.3  4.6  .8  1.2  .9 
5.8  4.0  .9  1.4  1.1 
4.4  5.8  .7  .9  .4 
6.0  2.8  -18.7  -14.1  -15.4 
......  ......... 
















-  15.8 
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-  .8 
-2.3 





















-20.0  -20.0  ...... 
-13.0  -13.0  ...... 
............ 
12.7  12.7  3.0  4.7 
14.7  14.7  3.0  5.5 
8.5  8.5  3.1  3.0 
34.9  34.9  2.8  4.7 
31.3  39.3  6.5  8.0 
25.3  25.3  -6.3  -3.6 
Source; Federal Statistical Office, Czech Statistical Office and The Czechoslovak State Bank. 
Note: CSFR = Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; CR = Czech Republic; SR = Slovak Republic. 
"1992 data are preliminary. 
bEnd-of-quarter (year) data reflecting changes relative to the end of the previous year. 112  Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar 
Table 3.11  Savings in Foreign Currencies (KEs billion) 
Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May  Jun.  Jul.  Aug.  Sep.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec 
1990: 
Enterprises  , . ,  . , .  3.9  4.3  4.8  6.0  6.1  7.6  8.7  11.2  12.7  18.0 
Households  2.1  2.3  2.8  1.8  2.0  3.7  3.9  4.2  3.2  7.1  6.5  10.2 
Enterprises  15.0  15.5  14.1  21.7  21.2  21.1  21.5  21.6  22.8  21.8  19.5  19.8 
Households  11.3  12.6  14.0  15.4  16.7  18.2  19.2  21.1  22.3  23.2  24.4  26.6 
Enterprises  20.0  19.4  21.9  21.9  26.6  26.0  26.1 
Households  29.8  31.2  35.1  36.3  37.6  39.8  42.3 
1991: 
1992: 
Source: The Czechoslovak State Bank. 
Note: End-of-month data. 
there has also been a steady increase in the savings in foreign currencies. These 
figures, reported in billions of koruny in table 3.11, reflect not only the savings 
patterns but  also the relative  fluctuations of  the  major Western  currencies 
over time. 
As can be seen in table 3.2 above, a major response of  enterprises to the 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies has been an increasing reliance on inter- 
enterprise debt (credit). There are two data series that permit one to assess 
the extent of this phenomenon in Czechoslovakia. The first one-frozen  bank 
payments due to insufficient balances in  the bank accounts of  debtor enter- 
prises-captures  the extent of insolvency of firms as reflected in this one mea- 
sure. The series shows a major and continuous rise through the first quarter of 
1991 in both republics, exceeding 10 percent of total bank credit to all enter- 
prises from the third quarter of  1990 on. The series reportedly registered a 
significant decline in the Czech Republic in the second quarter of  1991, the 
period when the banks decided to discontinue the collection of these data.13 
The second data series refers to unpaid obligations of enterprises as shown 
in enterprise accounts. This series has been collected continuously since 1990, 
and it has the advantage that it also contains direct interenterprise debt that is 
not channeled through banks. The series depicts a major rise in interenterprise 
debt from KEs 45 billion at the end of  1990 to Kfs 145 billion at the end of 
1991. Hence, while the interenterprise debt was  equal to 8.4 percent of  the 
total bank credit to enterprises at the end of  1990, by  the end of  1991 it had 
jumped to over 28 percent. This is a significant rise, one that potentially repre- 
sents an enormous problem for the government and the banks. It also in large 
13. The decision to discontinue the collection of the data was related to the disintegration of the 
traditional monobank system and the reported difficulty in tracking frozen payments across the 
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part explains why virtually no state enterprises have gone bankrupt in the pres- 
ence of the seemingly very restrictive macroeconomic policies and great exter- 
nal shocks. The government has been aware of the problem, and in the fall of 
1991 it allocated KEs 50 billion from its (future) privatization income to the 
banks for the purpose of  increasing their capitalization  and partially  (selec- 
tively) reducing the bank debt of promising enterprises. The data on interenter- 
prise debt show a major decline in the first half of 1992 to KEs  123.7 billion. 
This is welcome news for the government, but the accuracy of this series for 
recent months needs to be checked. 
As far as foreign trade is concerned, Czechoslovakia carried out a major 
structural transformation. After registering a significant trade deficit in  1990, 
Czechoslovakia appears to have achieved a surplus in 1991 (table 3.5 above). 
Other official data also indicate that trade with the (former) socialist economies 
accounted for more than 60 percent of  the total trade in  1989 but that this 
share dropped to about 50 percent in 1990 and 40 percent in 1991. Trade in 
nonconvertible currency basically disappeared in 199  1, and Germany replaced 
the Soviet Union as Czechoslovakia’s main trading partner, accounting for al- 
most one-quarter of Czechoslovakia’s foreign trade. 
A major controversy surrounds the question of whether trade contracted or 
expanded during the transition. Official estimates suggest that the physical vol- 
ume of exports declined 30 percent and imports 31 percent in the first six 
months of  1991 and that a slight rebound  in exports occurred thereafter. A 
relevant source of data in this context is the OECD. The OECD data, presented 
in tables 3.6 and 3.7 above, suggest that Czechoslovak exports to OECD coun- 
tries have grown strongly and continuously between 1989 and the first quarter 
of 1992. These data also indicate that Czechoslovak imports from OECD coun- 
tries grew until the first quarter of  1991, declined by about  10 percent in the 
second and third quarters of  199  1, and rebounded strongly in the fourth quar- 
ter. The OECD data hence paint a much more optimistic picture of trade expan- 
sion than the official Czechoslovak data. Since the official Czechoslovak data 
are based on incomplete customs statistics, it appears that the OECD data may 
provide a better reflection of trade performance with the advanced countries. 
3.3.1  Privatization 
Privatization is the cornerstone of the transformation program, and arguably 
the success of the transition hinges on the ability of the government to trans- 
form the inefficient state-owned enterprises into efficient private ones. The pri- 
vatization of  small- and medium-sized enterprises and other economic units 
has been relatively successful. While perhaps proceeding more slowly than 
originally forecast, in  199  1 the Czechoslovak government sold over 15,000 
units, and by the third quarter of  1992 the figure was close to 30,000. An even 
more important means of privatizing small- and medium-sized properties has 
been the restitution of property to previous (pre-1948) owners or their heirs. 114  Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar 
By mid-1992, over  120,000 units were restored through a process that also 
included housing, thus creating a precondition for the future establishment of 
a real  estate  market.  The proceeds  from the  small-scale privatization  have 
amounted to about KEs 15 billion (about $500 million) in 1991.  In comparison, 
the amount of foreign investment for 1991 was about $600 million. 
The process of privatizing approximately 6,000 large firms is divided into 
two waves. The first wave covers 2,930 firms (2,210 of them in the Czech Re- 
public), and it has been taking place since the spring of 1992.  The firms being 
privatized are selected from among a number of competing projects proposed 
to the Czech and Slovak ministries of privatization as well as the federal Minis- 
try of Finance. The projects can be prepared by  any domestic or foreign indi- 
vidual or group, who can propose to follow any one or a combination of the 
permissible privatization methods, ranging from direct sale to an individual or 
a private domestic or foreign firm to distribution of virtually all shares to citi- 
zens at large through a system of vouchers. 
In the first wave, 1,491 of the 2,930 firms have allocated part of their shares 
for the voucher privatization  scheme, which consists of  the following proce- 
dure. Each adult Czechoslovak citizen who is a permanent resident of Czecho- 
slovakia is entitled to purchase a voucher book with 1,000  investment “points” 
for KEs  1,000 (somewhat less than one-third of  the average monthly wage). 
Some 8.56 million adults (i.e., most of the eligible individuals) have purchased 
these voucher books, and, during the first wave of privatization, they have used 
the points to bid for those shares of the 1,491 companies that have been allo- 
cated  for voucher  distribution.  The voucher-book  holders  have  voluntarily 
placed 72 percent of their points in the hands of  forty-three privately formed 
investment privatization funds (IPFs), which bid for enterprise shares on behalf 
of the individual investors. As a result, 28 percent of the points are being in- 
vested directly by individuals. 
The process of converting  points into shares within  the  wave consists of 
rounds in which the bidders (individuals and IPFs) know the administratively 
set price of  a share (in terms of  points) of  each enterprise and submit their 
written  bids accordingly. In each round,  shares are exchanged for points in 
those cases where the supply of shares exceeds the demand by individuals and 
IPFs, with the remaining shares being offered in the following round at a lower 
price.  In those cases where demand exceeds supply by  less than 25 percent 
and there is a “sufficient” demand for shares by the IPFs, the shares are first 
distributed to the bidding individuals, and the remainder are then rationed pro- 
portionately to the bidding IPFs. SufJicient demand of IPFs means that no IPF 
should receive  less than  80 percent of  its demand.  In cases where demand 
exceeds supply by more than 25 percent or where the IPFs would have to be 
rationed by more than 20 percent of their bid, points are returned, no trans- 
action takes place, and the price of shares is raised by the government for the 
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As of  November 1992, the process has gone through four rounds.14 It was 
very successful in that a majority of  points had already been exchanged for 
shares after the second round and an overwhelming majority of individuals and 
IPFs participated in each round. At the end of the fourth round, only 8 percent 
of points remained unallocated. Similarly, most shares slated for voucher priva- 
tization were thus placed. The problem with the scheme is that it generates few 
complete transactions and tends not to converge. Thus, in the first three rounds, 
less than 10  percent of all the firms participating in the first wave of the voucher 
privatization sold all their shares. Similarly, the price adjustments carried out 
by  the authorities have sometimes been excessive, with the result that most 
firms have been switching between excess supply and demand between rounds. 
At present, the government expects to terminate the bidding process by  force 
in round 5 before the end of  1992. 
The Czechoslovak government launched the voucher privatization process 
in the expectation that a large number of  state enterprises would rapidly im- 
prove their economic performance and stop relying on government subsidies. 
A major process of this kind of course also entails risks, and, as of November 
1992, the Czech and Slovak governments were holding different views of the 
outcome. The Czech government sees the voucher privatization process as a 
major  success  and intends to  use  vouchers for privatizing  most  of  the re- 
maining large firms (including energy, mines, the mail system, and telecommu- 
nications) in the second wave in 1993. In contrast, the Slovak government sees 
the entire voucher scheme as slow and less efficient. As a result, it plans to rely 
more on traditional  privatization  means  (e.g., direct sales, auctions,  sealed 
bids, and employee stock ownership plans) in the second wave. With the parti- 
tion of Czechoslovakia into the separate Czech and Slovak republics on 1 Janu- 
ary  1993, one will hence observe two different privatization schemes being 
carried out in 1993. 
Let us briefly discuss two potential problems that may appear in the future 
in connection with the Czechoslovak voucher scheme. The first potential prob- 
lem is the lack of regulation of the IPFs. The IPFs have formed and until re- 
cently operated in a virtually unregulated environment. The precondition for 
starting a fund was the deposit of KEs 100,000 (about $3,300), a proof of KEs 
1 million (about $33,000) in net worth somewhere in the world, and a signed 
declaration of behavior in conformity with a law regulating IPFs that would be 
drafted and passed in the future. The conditions were trivial, and a large num- 
ber of IPFs quickly emerged, some being affiliated with reputable organiza- 
tions (e.g., banks) and others representing fly-by-night organizations. IPFs im- 
mediately started competing for voucher books, and, at the start of  January 
1992, a number of IPFs formally offered to pay fixed multiples of the KEs 
14. For a detailed assessment of  the first wave of  voucher privatization, see Svejnar and Singer 
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1,000 purchase value of the voucher books. In particular, each of these IPFs 
promised to pay its clients in one year a guaranteed sum (usually KEs 10,000- 
15,000) for the shares held for them by the IPF. 
These offers were important because they stimulated most Czechoslovaks 
to buy voucher books. Within a matter of weeks, the number of  individuals 
holding voucher books increased from 1.5 to 8.5 million. The mass purchase 
of voucher books increased the effective demand for shares, and, with the num- 
ber of firms tentatively slated for privatization approximately given, it greatly 
reduced the value of each voucher book. The promise of the attractive payout 
by some IPFs after one year also spurred a large number of individuals to place 
their vouchers with these IPFs and created a significant danger of a run on the 
unregulated funds in one year’s time. In the meantime, the funds realized that 
the value of  each voucher book is considerably less than was expected with 
1.5 million registrants, and some withdrew from the game. A law regulating 
the IPFs was eventually passed in 1992, but it does not require that funds prom- 
ising fixed payouts be obliged to deposit these amounts ex ante with the gov- 
ernment. The danger of  a run on the funds, a rapid fall in share prices, and 
some funds becoming insolvent hence remains a possibility. This aspect of IPF 
operations may become regulated. 
A related problem is the fact that the privatization ministries reacted to the 
growing number of voucher holders by attempting to increase the proportion 
of  shares slated for voucher privatization in individual privatization projects. 
While motivated by the desire to increase the supply of  shares for voucher 
privatization, the important side effect of this increased importance of voucher 
holders relative to other owners was a greater dispersion of future ownership 
among many firms. The problem of dispersed ownership and inadequate cor- 
porate governance, inherent in the voucher privatization method, was thus po- 
tentially exacerbated. 
It is difficult to assess the seriousness of these potential problems arising in 
the context of the Czechoslovak privatization process. Yet  it is important to 
realize that a process of this magnitude can hardly be designed without flaws. 
There is no doubt that, apart from the special case of East Germany, Czechoslo- 
vakia has embarked on the most ambitious project of large-scale privatization 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
3.4  Evaluation 
By applying restrictive macroeconomic policies, the Czechoslovak govern- 
ment  succeeded in rapidly  extinguishing  the inflationary pressures  brought 
about by the sudden liberalization of about 85 percent of all prices on 1 January 
1991. Containing the price explosion within a period of  three to six months 
and maintaining price inflation at around  10 percent a year thereafter while 
gradually liberalizing the remaining prices has been an impressive accomplish- 
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omy has also adjusted remarkably in that the private  sector has been devel- 
oping rapidly  in response to the removal of  administrative restrictions, price 
liberalization, and provision of bank credit and exports have picked up after an 
initial period of major decline. 
On the negative side, one observes an economy that has plunged into a more 
severe and prolonged recession than  was officially  expected. The recession 
has to a significant extent been caused by external shocks associated with the 
disintegration of the CMEA and the associated unfavorable shift in the terms 
of trade. Part of it is spurious and due to systematic errors in data collection, 
especially the underreporting of private activities. 
In undertaking  tough measures, the government greatly benefited from the 
willingness of the population to undergo a painful transition. Unlike the other 
transitional  economies,  Czechoslovakia has experienced  virtually  no strikes 
and  social unrest.  Part of the tolerance can be attributed to cultural values; 
however, a part is due to the government’s resolve to move quickly and demon- 
strate results in such visible areas as privatization. 
The ability to maintain social peace is of course only one measure of suc- 
cess. The imminent partitioning of Czechoslovakia into independent  Czech 
and Slovak republics reflects not only cultural and social differences between 
the two nations but also the different views that the two governments have on 
how to proceed with economic policy. The Czech government intends to pur- 
sue relatively restrictive monetary and fiscal policies and complete the priva- 
tization process with the aid of  the voucher system. The Slovak government 
seems to prefer a more expansive macroeconomic policy and to place priority 
on more traditional methods of privatization. The impressive aspect of the par- 
titioning is the peaceful nature of the process and the concerned effort of the 
two governments to maintain to the greatest possible extent the existing eco- 
nomic links through a customs union and free mobility of all resources (includ- 
ing labor) and commodities. 
A major problem facing both republics in 1993 and thereafter is the restruc- 
turing of the large state or newly privatized enterprises. These firms have to a 
large extent avoided the effect of the restrictive policies by relying to an in- 
creasing extent on interenterprise debt (credit). To some extent, the rise of in- 
terenterprise credits is to be expected in a newly established market economy. 
Yet the debt has risen too fast, and, despite the restrictive macroeconomic poli- 
cies, not enough enterprises have been forced to close down so far. The impres- 
sive stabilization exercise has thus been accompanied by  only limited enter- 
prise  restructuring.  The  expected  remedy  for  this  problem  is  large-scale 
privatization, the first wave of which is to be concluded at the end of 1992. 
One of the most important questions is whether the large-scale transfer of 
ownership will result in rapid restructuring and improved efficiency of a great 
number of enterprises. Yet there was hardly any real alternative to the voucher 
system of privatization. Without it, new investment would hardly come in. And 
new investment is indispensable for medium- and long-run growth. Given the 118  Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar 
generally outdated technology, falling investment, and limited, although grow- 
ing, extent of foreign investment ($600 million in 1991 and about $1 billion in 
1992), the ability of the Czech and Slovak economies to expand and remain 
competitive as wages rise depends crucially on technological innovation and 
substantial productivity improvements. 
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COEUIlent  David Begg 
As one would expect, Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar have given us a balanced 
and informative account of developments within what, for the moment at least, 
remains the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). I agree with most of 
their analyses and judgments, and I welcome their effort to provide us with as 
up-to-date data as possible. In what follows, I focus on the areas in which my 
emphasis would have been different, and I try to indicate where I think the 
authors still leave questions unanswered. 
I begin with bank credit and the related issue of the explosion of interenter- 
prise debts. To  my mind, the authors give too little attention to the first, too 
much to the second. It is hard to imagine a well-functioning market economy 
without a reasonably stable and well-run banking system. If  credit contracts 
are not enforced, budget  constraints do not bite, and prices do not allocate 
resources. Yet, in most of Central and Eastern Europe, this is precisely what is 
happening. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) began the transition to the market 
with bank debts from the past, an arbitrary endowment conveying little infor- 
mation about managerial efficiency or prospective profits under the new re- 119  Stabilization and Transition in Czechoslovakia 
gime. The response of banks, still state owned, has been to allow most SOEs 
to ignore scheduled payments and to capitalize arrears. In itself, this may not 
be undesirable, precisely because the original debt endowments had little eco- 
nomic significance. Unfortunately, however, waiving scheduled payments and 
capitalization of arrears is quickly extended from original loans to new loans 
used to finance operating deficits of SOEs. 
This latter channel has several very unhelpful effects. First, for a given mon- 
etary target, too much credit is automatically preempted by incumbent SOEs. 
Not only does this impede the allocation of credit to new private businesses- 
which in table 3.2 would have been larger but for this effect-but  it also inhib- 
its  restructuring of  the  enterprise sector.  Second, until  budget  constraints 
harden and bankruptcies are enforced, corporate governance will remain weak. 
Third, as the authors observe, the banking sector, worried about the soundness 
of  its loan book, is likely to respond by pressing for wider spreads between 
lending and deposit interest rates. The authorities in the CSFR have allowed 
this to occur (although to a lesser extent than in some neighboring countries). 
But such financial repression is an inefficient method of recapitalizing banks, 
a lesson of the earlier experience in Latin America. 
In  such circumstances, the social return to swift recapitalization of  banks 
(which in turn facilitates early privatization of banks and greater competition 
in this sector) is extremely high. Begg and Portes (1992) discuss how  this 
should be undertaken and explode some common myths. For example, it is 
often alleged that the public finances, already strained, will not withstand the 
additional burden of bailing out banks by writing off SOE debts. Yet, properly 
measured, the public finances bore the cost at the instant that past loans to 
SOEs became nonperforming. Marking to market merely recognizes that real- 
ity.  The CSFR has led the way  in Central and Eastern Europe in making a 
(small) start on recapitalizing the banks. The larger amount still required will 
add to the budget deficit. One useful role that external lender-monitors such as 
the International Monetary Fund can play is to confirm that this better book- 
keeping does not violate previous conditionality agreements, whose targets for 
the budget deficit should be correspondingly adjusted. 
In contrast, although, like the authors, I have also lamented the explosion of 
interenterprise debt in the CSFR and elsewhere (Begg 1991), I now take the 
view that this problem is greatly exaggerated. First, as the authors are aware, 
most statistics are gross before any attempt to clear what A owes B, B owes C, 
and C owes A. Second, one should bear in mind that, in mature Western econo- 
mies, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, the magnitude of inter- 
enterprise debts at any point in time is about the same as the outstanding stock 
of bank credit to companies. Table 3.2 indicates that, as elsewhere in Central 
and Eastern Europe, interenterprise debts are rising sharply but from a tiny 
base: even now, they remain much smaller in relation to bank credit than in the 
United States or the United Kingdom. Third, interenterprise credits are, to an 
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scribed above. Suppliers would press more readily for payment if  they knew 
that, otherwise, their cash flow would suffer and could not automatically be 
replenished via further bank loans. 
These remarks aside, I share the authors’ judgments about the evolution of 
the CSFR economy, although in places I wished that their analysis had gone 
further. The degree of  wage moderation during 1991 was spectacular, and I 
find it hard to assess the success, or, more accurately, the prospects for continu- 
ing success, of the stabilization policy without at least an implicit judgment as 
to the reasons why wages remained so low. Is social cohesion greater than in 
neighboring countries such as Poland, or was the threat of unemployment the 
principal explanation? The answer matters since it may prove hard to sustain 
social cohesion, whereas the threat of rising unemployment is likely to be pres- 
ent for many years to come. Since the authors offer us neither an analysis of 
the past nor even a guesstimate about the future, we are left intrigued but unsat- 
isfied by their discussion of the labor market. 
More generally, if  the trailblazing Polish experience is anything to go by, 
there is at least the possibility that Dyba and Svejnar have taken their snapshot 
at the very time peculiarly favorable to reform: just before a wage explosion 
and just before the public finances get seriously out of control through inability 
to collect taxes, a shrinking tax base, and mounting pressures for public expen- 
diture. Of  course, these may not happen in the CSFR, and I am sure that we 
all hope that they will not. The authors mention some disquieting signals in 
passing, but I would have liked them to tackle this issue head on. 
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Discussion Summary 
Josef Zieleniec said that the government is not doing enough to encourage the 
formation of new start-up firms in the private sector. He noted that new private 
firms are disadvantaged  because they  cannot provide  collateral  when  they 
apply for loans. As a result of this problem, and the general problem of under- 
capitalization in the banking sector, the banks have been unwilling to extend 
credit to the new firms. 
Jan  Winiecki warned that Czechoslovakia’s current account surplus would 
not last. He noted that many of the East European economies have experienced 121  Stabilization and Transition in Czechoslovakia 
short-lived trade surpluses just after reforms were implemented. At the time of 
price liberalization, firms held large stocks of inputs and finished goods. After 
these inputs are used up and the goods are sold, the trade balance deteriorates. 
This pattern of  sales also generates temporarily high accounting profits and 
associated tax payments. 
Kemal Dervig suggested that it may possible for the Czechoslovakian invest- 
ment privatization funds (IPFs) to provide 1,000 percent returns. He empha- 
sized that these returns are not related to the marginal product of capital. In- 
stead, these returns reflect the peculiar features of Czechoslovakia’s voucher 
scheme. Dervia noted that it is difficult to guess the ultimate market value of 
the privatized firms. In East Germany, the realized sale value of public assets 
has been zero or negative. However, public assets in Czechoslovakia might be 
more valuable because the profitability of East German firms was wiped out 
by the German exchange rate and wage policy. Dervig said that Czechoslovakia 
has one of the most competitive exchange rates in the region. 
Michael Bruno questioned whether the large spread between deposit and 
lending rates is linked to tight monetary policy. He said that it is possible that 
the spread reflects weak balance sheets in the banking sector, notably a large 
proportion of bad loans. If this is the problem, a monetary expansion will not 
help. Rather, the banks need to be recapitalized. Bruno also warned that the 
current account will eventually deteriorate. Because Czechoslovakia is a rela- 
tively open economy, a rebound in output will produce a big increase in im- 
ports. Finally, Bruno speculated that the sharp rise in Slovakia’s unemployment 
rate is related to the fact that the Slovaks were relatively more vulnerable to 
the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) shock than the Czechs. 
Dani Rodrik criticized the accuracy of the official Czechoslovak trade statis- 
tics. He said that OECD data indicate that trade volume increased during the 
first quarter of  1991, contradicting the Czechoslovak data. Rodrik suggested 
that the rise in Czechoslovakia’s  reported trade volume levels during the second 
half of  1991 might be a reflection of an improvement in bookkeeping tech- 
niques. Rodrik also discussed the macroeconomic effect of the CMEA shock. 
He estimated that two-fifths of the 19  percent output decline in Czechoslovakia 
can be attributed to the CMEA collapse. 
Jefiey Suchs also questioned the reliability of some of the statistical data in 
the paper. Sachs was particularly critical of the consumption estimates in the 
Czechoslovak national accounts. In his work with Andrew Berg, Sachs found 
that Polish household consumption data did not support the consumption num- 
bers in the Polish GNP accounts. Berg and Sachs discovered that the Polish 
national accounts focused overwhelmingly on the official sector, missing all 
consumption coming from the private sector, including the booming retail sec- 
tor. With this in mind, Sachs questioned the accuracy of the reported 30 percent 
decline in Czechoslovak real personal consumption. In addition to these obser- 
vations, Sachs suggested that the authors devote more analysis to the distinc- 
tions between Bohemia and Slovakia. Finally, he suggested that the authors 122  Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar 
should report on the development of new private-sector firms instead of focus- 
ing on the process of  privatization of state-owned firms. 
Karel Dyba made several comments. First, he agreed with Rodrik that the 
CMEA shock by itself could not account for the decline in output. Dyba said 
that, if Finland is used as a benchmark, then the CMEA shock explains half 
the Czechoslovak output decline. Second, he criticized the hypothesis that the 
banks were facing severe financial problems. He said that the banks tend to 
exaggerate their problems. Third, Dyba discussed the particular problems of 
Slovakia, notably that Slovakia has been more oriented toward the Soviet mar- 
ket and that Slovaks have less “economic education” than their Czech counter- 
parts. Finally, he emphasized the need to push forward with reforms quickly. 
He said that Czechoslovaks have to move ahead and master problems as they 
arise. He concluded that inaction is much worse than action with possible mis- 
takes. 